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Abstract—This letter investigates the ergodic secrecy capac-
ity (ESC) of a reconfigurable intelligent surface (RIS)-assisted
communication system in the presence of discrete phase shifts
and multiple eavesdroppers (Eves). In particular, a closed-form
approximation of the ESC is derived for both non-colluding and
colluding Eves. The analytical results are shown to be accurate
when the number of reflecting elements of the RIS N is large.
Asymptotic analysis is provided to investigate the impact of N
on the ESC, and it is proved that the ESC scales with log2N
for both non-colluding and colluding Eves. Numerical results are
provided to verify the analytical results and the obtained scaling
laws.
Index Terms—Reconfigurable intelligent surface, discrete
phase shifts, multiple eavesdroppers, ergodic secrecy capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Reconfigurable intelligent surfaces (RISs) utilize a large
number of passive reflecting elements to customize wire-
less communication environments [1]–[4]. In particular, the
amplitude and phase shift of each reflecting element can
be controlled, so that the received signal at the intended
receiver can be strengthened through passive beamforming [5].
Due to the low-cost, high energy-efficiency and full-duplex
advantages, RISs are regarded as a promising technology for
the next-generation wireless communications and hence have
recently received much academic and industrial attention [6]–
[8].
RISs have various potential applications in wireless commu-
nications, which include the design of secure wireless systems
based on the concept of physical layer security (e.g., [9]–[14]).
In [9]–[12], the authors investigated optimization problems to
jointly design the beamforming vectors and phase shifts at
the transmitter and RIS, respectively. In general, there exist
two objectives for the design of the phase shifts at the RIS:
(i) to strengthen the legitimate channels by co-phasing the
reflected signals with the signal directly received from the
transmitter; and (ii) to suppress the eavesdropping channels
by setting the reflected signals at the eavesdroppers (Eves)
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to be in opposite phase with respect to the signal from the
transmitter. The key idea behind the optimization problems
in the existing works [9]–[12] lies in achieving a favorable
trade-off between these two design objectives, which requires
the knowledge of the instantaneous eavesdropping channel
state information (CSI) at the transmitter and RIS. However,
the instantaneous eavesdropping CSI is difficult to obtain in
practice, since the Eves are usually passive and do not actively
communicate with other nodes. Motivated by this consider-
ation, the authors of [13] and [14] considered RIS-assisted
secrecy communications without assuming the knowledge of
the instantaneous eavesdropping CSI. In particular, the authors
of [13] proposed a joint beamforming and jamming scheme
to enhance the secrecy rate, and the authors of [14] analyzed
the secrecy outage probability at the RIS. However, these two
works only considered a single eavesdropper and assumed
continuous phase shifts at the reflecting elements of the RIS.
Different from these existing works, this letter investigates
the ergodic secrecy capacity (ESC) of RIS-assisted systems
in the presence of discrete phase shifts and multiple Eves.
In particular, by approximately characterizing the distribution
of the received signal-to-noise-ratios (SNRs) at the Eves, we
obtain a closed-form approximation of the ESC for both non-
colluding and colluding Eves. In order to provide insights,
asymptotic analysis is also provided from the obtained ESC,
and it is proved that, as the number of reflecting elements
N goes to infinity, the ESC scales with logN for both non-
colluding and colluding Eves. Numerical results are illustrated
to verify that the analytical results and the scaling laws are
accurate for large values of N .
Notation: C and Z denote the complex domain and integer
set, respectively; for brevity, we denote [1 :M ] , {1, . . . ,M},
where M is a positive integer, and [x]+ , max{0, x}; CN
denotes the complex Gaussian distributions; E[·] denotes the
expectation of a random variable; log(·) and ln(·) denote the
base-two and natural logarithms, respectively; and κ is Euler’s
constant.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider an RIS-assisted secure
communication system with a source (S), an RIS (R) with
N reflecting elements, a destination (D) and K Eves (Ek,
∀k ∈ [1 : K]). All nodes are assumed to be equipped with
a single antenna. The channels S → D, S → Ek , S → R,
R → D and R → Ek are denoted by hSD ∈ C, hSEk ∈ C,
hSR ∈ CN×1, hRD ∈ CN×1 and hk ∈ CN×1, respectively.
These channels are modeled as hSD = gSDd
−α
2
SD , hSEk =
gSEkd
−α
2
SEk
, [hSR]n = gSR,nd
−α
2
SR , [hRD]n = gRD,nd
−α
2
RD and
2Ek
D
   S
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k
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h
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Fig. 1. RIS-assisted secrecy communication system.
[hk]n = gk,nd
−α
2
k , where gSD, gSEk , gSR,n, gRD,n, gk,n ∼
CN (0, 1) denote the small-scale fading, dSD , dSEk , dSR, dRD
and dk denote the distances S → D, S → Ek, S → R,
R→ D and R→ Ek, respectively, ∀n ∈ [1 : N ], k ∈ [1 : K],
and α is the pass-loss exponent. Then, the received signal at
D and Ek can be written as
yD =
√
P
(
ηh
T
SRΦhRD + hSD
)
xS + nD, (1)
yEk =
√
P
(
ηh
T
SRΦhk + hSEk
)
xS + nEk , (2)
respectively, where xS is the transmitted signal, E(|xS |2) = 1,
P is the transmit power, nD and nEk ∼ CN (0, δ2) are
the additive white Gaussian noises at D and Ek, respec-
tively, η ∈ (0, 1] is the amplitude reflection coefficient,
Φ , diag(ejφ1 , . . . , ejφN ) and φn ∈ [0, 2pi) is the nth
phase shift at the RIS. We assume that the RIS does not
have access to the instantaneous eavesdropping CSI, so that
it cannot design φn in order to suppress the received SNRs
at the Eves. However, the RIS is assumed to know the
instantaneous legitimate CSI. Under these assumptions, the
optimal value of φn that maximizes the received SNR at D
is φ∗n = θSD − θSR,n − θRD,n, where θSD, θSR,n and θRD,n
denote the phases of gSD, gSR,n and gRD,n, respectively.
Furthermore, in this letter, φn can only take a finite number of
discrete values. In particular, the set of discrete phase shifts is
denoted by F ,
{
0, 2pi
2b
, . . . , (2
b−1)2pi
2b
}
, where b denotes the
number of quantization bits. Accordingly, we set φn = f1(φ
∗
n),
where the function f1(φ
∗
n) maps φ
∗
n to the nearest point in F ,
i.e.,
f1(φ
∗
n) = φˆi, if |φ∗n − φˆi| ≤ |φ∗n − φˆj |, φˆi, φˆj ∈ F , ∀j 6= i. (3)
Therefore, the quantization error is Θn = f1(φ
∗
n) − φ∗n,
which is uniformly distributed in
[− pi
2b
, pi
2b
]
, similar to [15]–
[18]. Accordingly, the received SNRs at D and Ek can be
formulated, respectively, as follows
γD = ρ
∣∣∣∣∣|hSD|+ η
N∑
n=1
|[hSR]n[hRD]n| ejΘn
∣∣∣∣∣
2
= ρ
∣∣∣∣∣d−
α
2
SD |gSD|+ ηd
−α
2
SR d
−α
2
RD
N∑
n=1
|gSR,ngRD,n|ejΘn
∣∣∣∣∣
2
, (4)
γEk = ρ
∣∣∣∣∣hSEk + η
N∑
n=1
|[hSR]n[hk]n| ejψk,n
∣∣∣∣∣
2
= ρ
∣∣∣∣∣d−
α
2
SEk
gSEk + ηd
−α
2
SR d
−α
2
k
N∑
n=1
|gSR,ngk,n| ejψk,n
∣∣∣∣∣
2
, (5)
where ψk,n , f2(φ
∗
n, θSR,n) + θk,n, θk,n is the phase of gk,n
and the function f2(φ
∗
n, θSR,n) is defined as follows
f2(φ
∗
n, θSR,n) , f1(φ
∗
n) + θSR,n. (6)
The ESC can be expressed as follows [19]
Cs = [CD − CE]+, (7)
where CD = EγD [log(1 + γD)] and CE denote the ergodic
capacities from S to D and the Eves, respectively. Given
{Θn}Nn=1, an approximated expression of CD can be found
in [16, Eq. (13)]. By averaging over {Θ}Nn=1, CD can be
calculated as shown in (8) at the top of the next page.
In the following sections, CE is calculated for non-colluding
and colluding Eves, respectively.
III. NON-COLLUDING EVES
In the non-colluding case, CE can be expressed as follows
CE = max
k∈[1:K]
CEk , (9)
where CEk , EγEk [log(1+γEk)]. In order to derive CEk , the
distribution of γEk in (5) needs to be computed.
A. Distribution of γEk
Before deriving the distribution of γEk , we introduce the
following lemma.
Lemma 1: The phase ψk,n, k ∈ [1 : K], n ∈ [1 : N ], in
(5) has the following properties:
a) ψk,n is uniformly distributed in [0, 2pi);
b) ψk,n is independent of f2(φ
∗
n, θSR,n) defined in (6);
c) ψk,i is independent of ψk,j , ∀i 6= j, i, j ∈ [1 : N ].
Proof 1: See Appendix A.
Based on Lemma 1, the distribution of γEk in (5) is provided
in the following lemma.
Lemma 2: When N is large, γEk can be approximated as
an exponential random variable with mean λEk = ρ
(
d−αSEk +
NBk
)
, where Bk , η
2d−αSRd
−α
k .
Proof 2: Define Gk ,
∑N
n=1 |gSR,ngk,n| ejψk,n , k ∈ [1 :
K]. Based on [20, Lemma 2] and the fact that {ψk,n}Nn=1 are
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) uniform random
variables in [0, 2pi) as proved in Lemma 1, Gk ∼ CN (0, N)
as N → ∞. Furthermore, since gSEk is independent of Gk,
we have
d
−α
2
SEk
gSEk+ηd
−α
2
SR d
−α
2
k Gk ∼ CN
(
0, d−αSEk+NBk
)
,
as N → ∞. Recalling that γEk = ρ
∣∣∣d−α2SEkgSEk +√BkGk
∣∣∣2
in (5), the proof follows.
B. Ergodic Secrecy Capacity
The ESC for non-colluding Eves is summarized in the
following theorem.
Theorem 1: When N is large, the ESC for non-colluding
Eves can be expressed as follows
Cs ≈
[
CD +
1
ln 2
max
k∈[1:K]
e
1
λEk Ei
(
− 1
λEk
)]+
, (10)
where Ei(x) , − ∫∞−x e−tt dt, x < 0, is the exponential integral
function [21, Eq. 8.211].
3CD≈ log
(
1+ρ
(
Nη2d−αSRd
−α
RD+d
−α
SD+
pi
3
2 η
4
d
−α
2
SD d
−α
2
SR d
−α
2
RD
N∑
n=1
EΘn [cosΘn]+
pi2η2
8
d−αSRd
−α
RD
N−1∑
i=1
N∑
k=i+1
EΘi,Θk [cos(Θk−Θi)]
))
= log
(
1 + ρNA1 + ρd
−α
SD + ρNA2 + ρN(N − 1)A3
)
, (8)
where A1 , η
2d−αSRd
−α
RD , A2 ,
√
piη2b
4 d
−α
2
SD d
−α
2
SR d
−α
2
RD sin
pi
2b
and A3 ,
η222b
32 d
−α
SRd
−α
RD
(
1−cos 2pi
2b
)
.
Proof 3: When N is large, based on Lemma 2, CEk in (9)
can be approximated as follows
CEk ≈
∫ ∞
0
log(1 + x)
1
λEk
e
− x
λEk dx =
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
e
− x
λEk
1 + x
dx
=− e
1
λEk
ln 2
Ei
(
− 1
λEk
)
, (11)
where the last equality is based on [21, Eq. 3.352.4]. Com-
bining (7), (9) and (11), the theorem is proved.
C. Asymptotic Analysis
To obtain insights from the obtained ESC, its asymptotic
behavior is analyzed in the following corollary.
Corollary 1: As N → ∞, Cs → logN + logA3 +
κ
ln 2−maxk∈[1:K] logBk, which implies that the ESC for non-
colluding Eves scales with logN .
Proof 4: From (8), we have
CD≈ log
(
ρA3N
2
(
1
ρA3N2
+
A1
A3N
+
d−αSD
A3N2
+
A2−A3
A3N
+1
))
→ 2 logN + log ρ+ logA3, as N →∞. (12)
In addition, CEk in (11) can be further expressed as follows
CEk
(a)≈ e
1
λEk
ln 2
(
−κ+ ln(λEk) +
∞∑
i=1
(−1)i+1
i · i! · λiEk
)
(b)→ log(λEk)−
κ
ln 2
(c)
= log (NρBk) + log
(
1 +
d−αSEk
NBk
)
− κ
ln 2
→ logN + log ρ+ logBk − κ
ln 2
, as N →∞. (13)
where (a) is based on (11) and [21, Eq. 8.214.1], (b) holds
since 1/λEk → 0 as N → ∞, and (c) is based on the
definition of λEk in Lemma 2.
Combining (7), (9), (12) and (13), this corollary follows.
Remark 1: Compared with the scaling law 2 logN for
non-secrecy transmission with discrete phase shifts [15], [16],
Corollary 1 shows that the ESC has a different scaling law
that is equal to logN .
IV. COLLUDING EVES
When the Eves are colluding, they can combine their
received signals for information interception. Thus, the CE
in (7) can be expressed as follows
CE = E{γEk}
K
k=1
log
(
1 +
K∑
k=1
γEk
)
. (14)
Since common random variables {gSR,n}Nn=1 are present in
every γEk as shown in (5), {γEk}Kk=1 are correlated random
variables. However, the following lemma shows that such
correlation is negligible for large values of N .
Lemma 3: γEi is independent of γEj if N → ∞, i, j ∈
[1 : K], i 6= j.
Proof 5: See Appendix B.
A. Ergodic Secrecy Capacity
Based on Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, the ESC is provided in
the following theorem.
Theorem 2: When N is large, and λEi 6= λEj , ∀i 6= j,
i, j ∈ [1 : N ], the ESC for colluding Eves can be approximated
as follows
Cs≈

CD+ 1
ln 2
K∑
i=1
e
1
λEi Ei
(
− 1
λEi
) K∏
j=1,j 6=i
λEi
λEi−λEj


+
. (15)
Proof 6: Based on Lemma 3, if λEi 6= λEj , ∀i 6= j,∑K
k=1 γEk has the following probability density function
(PDF) [22]:
f∑K
k=1
γEk
(x)=
K∑
i=1
1
λEi
e
− x
λEi
K∏
j=1,j 6=i
λEi
λEi−λEj
. (16)
Combining (11), (14) and (16), we obtain
CE ≈ − 1
ln 2
K∑
i=1
e
1
λEi Ei
(
− 1
λEi
) K∏
j=1,j 6=i
λEi
λEi − λEj
. (17)
Recalling (7), we prove the theorem.
Remark 2: Theorem 2 corresponds to the case that the
Eves lie in different locations, so that {γEk}Kk=1 have different
means. When the Eves are clustered relatively closely together
that {γEk}Kk=1 have the same mean, the ESC can be analyzed
in a similar way, whose details are not provided due to space
limitations.
B. Asymptotic Analysis
The asymptotic behavior of the obtained ESC for colluding
Eves is provided in the following corollary.
Corollary 2: As N →∞, Cs → logN + logA3 + κln 2 −∑K
i=1 logBi
∏K
j=1,j 6=i
Bi
Bi−Bj , which implies that the ESC for
colluding Eves also scales with logN .
Proof 7: From (11), (13) and (17), we have
CE →
K∑
i=1
(
logN+logρ− κ
ln 2
+logBi
) K∏
j=1,j 6=i
λEi
λEi−λEj
(a)→
K∑
i=1
(
logN+logρ− κ
ln 2
+logBi
) K∏
j=1,j 6=i
Bi
Bi−Bj
(b)
= logN+logρ− κ
ln 2
+
K∑
i=1
logBi
K∏
j=1,j 6=i
Bi
Bi−Bj , (18)
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Fig. 2. Ergodic secrecy capacity vs. N , for K = 5.
where (a) holds since λEk = ρNBk
(
1 +
d
−α
SEk
NBk
)
→ ρNBk
as N → ∞, and (b) is based on the fact that∑K
i=1
∏K
j=1,j 6=i
Bi
Bi−Bj = 1, as proved in [22, Chapter 5].
Combining (7), (12), (14) and (18), the proof follows.
Remark 3: Comparing Corollaries 1 and 2, we evince that
only the last terms for the asymptotic ESC are different, i.e.,
maxk∈[1:K] logBk and
∑K
i=1 logBi
∏K
j=1,j 6=i
Bi
Bi−Bj for non-
colluding and colluding Eves, respectively. In addition, the
ESCs for both non-colluding and colluding Eves have the same
scaling law logN .
C. Large Number of Eves
To obtain more insights from the obtained ESC, we provide
a simplified expression of Cs for large values of K in the
following corollary.
Corollary 3: WhenN andK →∞, the ESC for colluding
Eves can be approximated as follows
Cs ≈
[
CD − log
(
1 +
K∑
k=1
λEk
)]+
. (19)
Proof 8: Based on Lemma 3,
Var
[∑K
k=1 γEk
]
→∑Kk=1 λ2Ek as N → ∞. Thus,
Var[
∑K
k=1 γk]
(E[
∑
K
k=1 γk])
2 →
∑K
k=1 λ
2
Ek
(
∑
K
k=1 λEk)
2 → 0 as N and K → ∞.
According to [23, Theorem 4], CE in (14) can be
approximated as follows
CE ≈ log
(
1 + E
[
K∑
k=1
γk
])
. (20)
This completes the proof.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, numerical results are provided to verify the
analytical results in the obtained theorems and corollaries. The
simulation results are averaged over 104 channel realizations.
For illustrative purposes, we set α = 3, b = 3 bits, P = 20
dBm, σ2 = −96 dBm and η = 0.8. In addition, S, R and D
are located at (0, 0) m, (100, 0)m and (90, 20)m, respectively.
As for the Eves, Ek is located at
(
90k
K
,−20) m, k ∈ [1 : K].
For the considered simulation configuration, the ESC is zero
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Fig. 3. Ergodic secrecy capacity vs. K , for N = 250.
in the absence of the RIS. In this case, in fact, the ESC for
non-colluding Eves can be expressed as follows
Cs=
[
EhSD [1+ρ|hSD|2]− max
k∈[1:K]
EhSEk
[1+ρ|hSEk |2]
]+
=
[
f3(dSD)− max
k∈[1:K]
f3(dSEk)
]+
, (21)
where f3(x) ,
1
ln 2
∫∞
0
e
− t
ρx−α /(1 + t)dt, x > 0. Therefore,
Cs = 0 in (21), since f3(x) is a decreasing function of x
and dSD ≥ dSEk in the considered simulation configuration,
∀k ∈ [1 : K].
Fig. 2 shows the impact of the number of reflecting elements
N on the ESC, when the number of Eves is K = 5. We
can observe that the ESC increases with N . For example, the
ESCs are about 3.7 bps/Hz and 2.5 bps/Hz for non-colluding
and colluding Eves, respectively, if N = 100. We observe
that the approximated analytical results in Theorems 1 and
2 match well with Monte Carlo simulations. In addition, the
asymptotic analytical results obtained in Corollaries 1 and 2
asymptotically approach the simulations as N becomes suffi-
ciently large, which confirms the scaling laws in Corollaries 1
and 2. The setup with non-colluding Eves provides a larger
secrecy capacity since only the “best” Eve determines the ESC.
There exists a constant gap of about 1 bps/Hz between the
ESCs for non-colluding and colluding Eves if N exceeds 104.
In Fig. 3, the ESC is shown as a function of the number
of Eves K , by assuming N = 250. This figure confirms the
findings in Corollary 3 for colluding Eves, and we observe that
the approximation in (19) becomes tighter as K increases. The
ESCs for both non-colluding and colluding Eves decrease with
K . However, the ESC for non-colluding Eves is less affected
by K . We observe, in particular, that there exists an ESC floor
of about 5 bps/Hz for large values of K . This is because the
ESC for non-colluding Eves is determined by the nearest Eve
to the source. In the considered simulation setup, the nearest
Eve is located at around (0,−20) m, when K is large.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This letter investigated the ESC of an RIS-assisted com-
munication system in the presence of discrete phase shifts
and multiple Eves. We obtained an approximated closed-form
5expression of the ESC for both non-colluding and colluding
Eves, which were demonstrated to be accurate for large values
of the number of RIS reflecting elements. By analyzing the
asymptotic behaviors of the obtained ESC, we unveiled that the
ESC scales with logN in the presence of both non-colluding
and colluding Eves. Numerical results were provided to verify
the accuracy of the analytical results and the scaling laws.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Let us denote X1,n , f2(φ
∗
n, θSR,n), X2,n , θk,n and
Yn , ψk,n. Accordingly, Yn = X1,n + X2,n as shown in
Section II. We note that the random phases X1,n, X2,n and
Yn have a uniform circular distribution
1 [15].
Given X1,n = x1, ∀x1 ∈ [0, 2pi), Yn = x1 + X2,n is uni-
formly distributed in [x1, x1+2pi) = [x1, 2pi)∪ [2pi, x1+2pi).
Since Yn has a circular uniform distribution, [2pi, x1 + 2pi)
is equivalent to [0, x1). Thus, Yn is uniformly distributed in
[0, 2pi), which proves Lemma 1-a).
Since X1,n and X2,n are independent, their joint PDF is
fX1,n,X2,n(x1, x2)=fX1,n(x1)fX2,n (x2)=
1
2pi
fX1,n(x1). (22)
We can construct the following Jacobian matrix
JX1,n,Yn(x1, x2) =
[
∂x1
∂x1
, ∂x1
∂x2
∂y
∂x1
, ∂y
∂x2
]
=
[
1, 0
1, 1
]
. (23)
Thus, the joint PDF of X1,n and Yn can be written as
fX1,n,Yn(x1, y) =
fX1,n,X2,n(x1, x2)
det(JX1,n,Yn(x1, x2))
=
1
2pi
fX1,n(x1)
= fX1,n (x1)fYn(y), (24)
which implies that Yn is independent of X1,n. Thus, Lemma
1-b) is proved.
For ∀i 6= j and i, j ∈ [1 : N ], we have Yi = X1,i + X2,i
and Yj = X1,j +X2,j . Although the same random phase θSD
is present in both Yi and Yj as shown in Section II, Yi is still
independent of Yj , due to the following two facts: (i) Yi and
Yj are independent of X1,i and X1,j , respectively, according
to Lemma 1-b); (ii) X2,i is independent of X2,j . Therefore,
Lemma 1-c) is proved.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Let us define HEk , d
−α
2
SEk
gSEk +√
Bk
∑N
n=1 |gSR,ngk,n| ejψk,n . Thus, γEk = ρ|HEk |2.
According to Lemma 1-a), E
[
ejψk,n
]
= 0 and
E [HEk ] = 0, ∀k ∈ [1 : K]. (25)
Moreover, since ψi,n is independent of ψj,m if i 6= j or n 6=
m, we have
E[HEiHEj ] = 0, ∀i 6= j. (26)
From (25) and (26), the covariance of HEi and HEj can be
expressed as follows
Cov(HEiHEj ) = E[HEiHEj ]− E[HEi ]E[HEj ] = 0. (27)
1A random phase X that follows a circular distribution fulfills the property
that all the realization points {x+ 2Mpi}∀M∈Z of X are equivalent to the
point x, where x ∈ [0, 2pi).
Based on Lemma 2 and (27), {Hk}Kk=1 are uncorrelated
complex Gaussian variables if N → ∞, and hence {Hk}Kk=1
are independent of each other. This completes the proof.
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